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PHILIPPINE FOREIGN INVESTMENT EFFORTS:
THE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS ACT
AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CODE
John F. Pierce
Abstract: The Philippine Government's efforts to attract foreign direct investments
have been ineffectual, especially when compared with the efforts of its Southeast Asian
neighbors. Foreign investment incentive legislation has been relatively ineffectual in
attracting the investment the Philippines sought due to the ambiguous and arbitrary
execution of its investment laws and policies. The Philippine Judiciary's unsettled
attitude toward foreign investment further enhanced the overall impression that the
Philippines was not a safe or stable investment host country. The Philippines' most
recent legislative attempt to lure foreign investment is the Foreign Investments Act of
1991. The Foreign Investments Act goes much further than its predecessors in
liberalizing access to the Philippine economy by promoting more transparent and
efficient investment laws and regulations. However, the Foreign Investments Act is
potentially marginalized by the Local Governments Code, which diffuses much of the
central government's powers to lure and to control foreign investment to local
government units, most of whom have diverse development and investment priorities.
Thus, the Foreign Investments Act alone is not likely to attract and keep the desired
investment. To lure foreign investment, the Philippines should provide some form of
efficient investor services that will account for the central and local governments'
priorities, differences and needs. This would promote productive and equitable foreign
investment by building on the strengths of the Foreign Investments Act while preserving
the integrity of local decisions mandated by the Local Governments Code.
INTRODUCTION
The Philippines actively seeks direct foreign investment through a
myriad of investment incentives.1 Currently, however, the Philippines has
difficulty attracting and keeping foreign investment. Investors perceive the
Philippines to be a risky investment host due to the capricious administration
of its investment laws and policies.2  Recognizing that investment
disincentives exist, and that the Philippines needs to improve its investment
I Investment incentives are generally statutory devises that encourage investors to invest in a
particular country, region or industry by reducing the investor's operating costs. These incentives
generally take the form of lower tax obligations, guarantees against specific state actions, and specific
market protections. The Philippines latest investment promotion effort, the Foreign Investments Act of
1991 (Investments Act), Republic Act No. 7042, is discussed at length below and in Appendix A.
2 Joel McCormick. Instability Hampers Philippines' Growth... , 17:11 Electronic Business 3, 49
(June 1991): citing unpredictable policy administration as an investment deterrent. See also Leo P.
Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Regulatory Developments, 11: 8 East Asian Executive Reports 13 (Aug.
15, 1989).
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climate, the Philippine government has recently enacted a new investment
regulatory scheme.
This Comment analyzes the Philippines' two recent statutory efforts to
improve its foreign investment climate. In 1991, the Philippines adopted the
Foreign Investments Act (Investments Act),3 and the Local Governments
Code (Local Code),4 both of which substantially liberalize foreign investment
laws and policies. The Investments Act increases foreign investor access to
the Philippine economy while attempting to make the Act's requirements and
administration more transparent and predictable. The Local Code
decentralizes the administration of investment laws by granting more
investment regulatory control to Philippine local government units. These
statutory efforts to improve the investment climate will likely succeed in
attracting increased foreign investment, yet may not be enough to overcome
the perception that the Philippines is a difficult, costly and risky place to
invest. To increase the efficacy of the Foreign Investments Act and the Local
Governments Code, and to ensure that foreign investment laws and policies
are fairly and efficiently administered, the Philippines should create a
centralized investor service center, modeled after the one established by
Thailand.5
I. PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT
A. The Present Foreign Investment Climate
Direct foreign investment is considered a vital element of a developing
country's strategy for economic development. Foreign investment provides
real economic benefits to the host country, including increased employment,
foreign exchange from exports, technology transfer, technical and managerial
expertise, and an increase in the government's tax base.6
The Philippine government recognizes that greater private foreign
investment is needed to provide jobs to its growing population, reduce its
foreign debt burden, and catch up (or maintain its relative position) to its
3 The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (Investments Act), Republic Act No. 7042.
4 The Local Governments Code of 1991 (Local Code), Republic Act No. 7160.
5 The Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister concerning the Formation of the Investment
Service Centre, the Government Gazette, Volume 99, Part 125, Special Issue of September 3. 1982.
6 Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World, 436-41 (New York: Longman
Press. 1985). and Anthony Kleitz, Trimming Investment Disincentives, 8:4 Asian-Pacific Tax and
Investment Bulletin 124-127 (Aug. 1990).
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rapidly developing Southeast Asian neighbors.7 However, investors perceive
the Philippines to be a poor investment alternative to its Southeast Asian
neighbors.8 Consequently, the Philippines has experienced only marginal
economic growth due to a decline in foreign investment activity, and
economic growth is predicted to be only 0.5% for 1992. 9 The Philippines has
fallen well behind the rapid economic growth and development of its
Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly Thailand.' 0
Several factors contribute to the perception of potential foreign
investors that the Philippines is a risky investment host. The inconsistent
administration of the Philippines' investment laws and policies undermines
the confidence of potential investors.11 Investment statutes tend to be vague,
7 Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Nationalistic Mood Begins to Change, 11:5 East Asian
Executive Reports 15, 18 (May 1989). Philippine Representative Mario Serra-Ty called for the relaxation
of the Philippines' investment policies, noting that the "tiger economies of Asia" are not afraid to welcome
foreign investors, and that was a reason that the "tigers were well ahead of the Philippines in economic
growth." See note 11.
8 Countly Reports, Philippines - Second Quarter 1991, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 17-18; Leo
P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment Climate, 10:6 East Asian Executive Reports 22 (June 15, 1988): article
cites several examples of investors opting for other Asian countries considered more hospitable to foreign
investment. See Bill Passes in Philippines allowing Developers to Own 100% of Projects, Independent
Power Report, 8 (July 5, 1991): A United Nations study confirmed Representative Serra-Ty's remarks
concluding that the Philippines must "radically reform its economy to promote industry" if it hoped to
comp9ete with its Asian neighbors.
I MF Predicts 0.5% Growth for Philippine Economy, Kyodo News Service (Nov. 1991): citing
International Monetary Fund (IM) official Christopher Browne.
10 Foreign Investors Keep Cool. Look to New Thai Leadership for Signals. Los Angeles Times, 3
(Mar. 4, 1991):
Projected Annual Percentage Growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
Nation 1990 1991 1992
Hong Kong 2.3 3.5 4.5
South Korea 8.7 7.5 6.8
Singapore 8.3 5.9 6.5
Taiwan 5.1 5.9 6.0
Indonesia 7.0 7.0 6.6
Malaysia 9.4 8.5 8.7
Philippines 2.5 2.1 4.1
Thailand 10.0 7.4 8.0
China 5.0 5.7 6.0
Japan 5.6 3.1 4.0
United States 0.9 0.5 2.3
Germany 4.6 2.8 2.6
World 1.7 1.0 2.7
Source: Asian Development Bank.
11 Victor Mallet, The Philippines 4; Belated Attempt to Remedy Matters - Investment, Financial
Times, 4 (Feb. 17, 1992); and Victor Mallet, The Philippines 2; Important Issues Still Need to be Tackled,
Financial Times, 2 (Feb. 16, 1992). See notes 2 and 8.
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and difficult for potential investors to interpret clearly. 12 Potential investors
also perceive the actions of the Philippine government to be contradictory.13
For example, when the nation's executive, President Corazon Aquino, loudly
advocated policies that welcomed foreign investment, 14 and took direct
measures to that end, 15 the Philippine Congress issued rules discouraging or
limiting foreign investment. 16
The actions of the Philippine judiciary further enhance the perception
of uncertainty. As discussed below, the Philippine judiciary has inconsistently
challenged the legitimacy and power of the executive and legislative
branches to regulate foreign investment. These rulings have given foreign
investors mixed signals regarding the receptiveness of the investment climate,
and have generated more lengthy and costly review of investment applications
and approvals.
B. The Restrictiveness of Past Investment Laws and Practice
In order to understand this uncertainty among foreign investors, one
must understand the factors contributing to the Philippines "economic
nationalism." Philippine economic nationalism found expression in particular
provisions of the Philippine Constitution and the Omnibus Investment Code
of 1987, as discussed below.
12 Jamie P. Horseley, Philippines Enacts New Investment Code, 13:7 East Asian Executive Reports
9 (July 15, 1991).
I3d.
14 Conditions to Improve For Foreign Investors, Aquino Says, Kyodo News Service (Nov. 20, 1991).
15 American Embassy in Manila, Philippines - Country Marketing Report FY '91, 1991 National
Trade Data Bank. Market Reports, 21 (June 12, 1991): Aquino ordered the Board of Investment to relax
its rules, simplify its procedures and devote its efforts to foreign investment and export promotion.
16 Leo P, Gonzaga, Foreign Investment Climate, 10:6 East Asian Executive Reports 22-23 (June 15,
1988): To illustrate, the Philippine legislature has proposed the forced divestiture of all foreign equity or
the "Filipinization." of the oil and insurance industries, while the Philippine drug industry has been totally
"Filipinized." Leo P. Gonzaga, Presence of Foreign Business Has Become Emotional Issue, 10:10 East
Asian Executive Reports 24 (Nov. 15, 1988): Among the investment restrictive statutes considered by the
Philippine Congress have been an entire ban on advertisements not "totally produced in the Philippines"
and whose concepts are not "intrinsically Filipino." a total ban on advertisements using foreign talent, and
the prohibition of construction contract awards to firms with Filipino equity ownership of less than 60
percent. Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Nationalistic Mood Begins to Change, 11:5 East Asian
Executive Reports 22-23 (May 15, 1989).
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1. Economic Nationalism
One can understand the Philippines historical disinclination toward
foreign investment in light of the nation's economic history under colonial
domination. Over four centuries of foreign domination has motivated strong
nationalistic sentiments in the Philippines, and explains much of the nation's
desire for more Filipino participation and protection of local interests in
economic development. Nationalistic motives have dominated the legislative
and administrative bodies, 17 and led the Philippine government to create a
legal framework that imposed limits on foreign investment in economic
activities. 18
2. Constitutional Restrictions on Foreign Equity and Land Ownership
The hallmarks of this legal framework are the restrictions on foreign
equity and on land ownership. The Philippine Constitution contains specific
provisions that restrict foreign equity in Philippine corporations or business
enterprises to 40 percent of outstanding equity.19 Further, the Constitution
prohibits all foreign ownership of land.20 These provisions create substantial
17 Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Nationalistic Mood Begins to Change, 11:5 East Asian
Executive Reports 18 (May 15, 1989).
For the historical basis of Philippine nationalism, see generally, Castro, Foreign Business
Enterprise .... 14-23: After Ferdinand Magellan stumbled upon the Philippine Islands in search of the
Spice Islands in 1521, the Spanish established a colonial government and imposed the galleon trade, thus
completely controlling trade. The Spanish government's economic administration and anti-foreign trade
policies forced the Philippines into a situation in which it became helplessly non-self-supporting. High
import duties were imposed on non-Spanish goods and shipping, and the entry of non-Spanish foreigners
and their investment capital were prevented. After 1898, under American rule, increased foreign
investment displaced indigenous investment. These investments targeted development of natural resources
for exports, and the manufacture of products for the domestic market, thus preventing domestic
investment and growth in these areas. This pattern of investment intensified and persisted in most areas
until the Philippines gained independence from the United States in 1946. The factors contributed to the
Philippine economic nationalism. See Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the
Philippines, (New York: Ballantine, 1990), 78-226. See William L. Schurz. The Manila Galleon, (New
York: Dutton, 1939) for further discussion of the opening of the Philippines to foreign trade and the
evolution of Spanish economic policy; Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest
of the Philippines, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Shirley Jenkins. American Economic
Policy Toward the Philippines, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1954).
18 Seija Naya, Miguel Urrtia, Shelley Mark, and Alfredo Fuentes, eds.. Lessons in Development: A
Comparative Study of Asia and Latin America, (San Francisco: International Center for Economic
Growth. 1989), 28-29: The Philippines. unlike most A.S.E.A.N. states, took an "inward looking"
development strategy, meaning a "pessimistic view was taken of the possibilities for promoting exports
and for transforming domestic savings into capital goods through trade."
19 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Article 7, Section 10 (1986).
20 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article 7, Section 2 (1986).
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disincentives to foreign investment. In the wake of the People Power
Revolution of 1986,21 President Corazon Aquino promulgated a new
Constitution which carried over the previous Constitution's restrictions on
foreign equity and land ownership. 22
3. The Omnibus Investment Code of 1987
President Aquino's government also enacted a new foreign investment
law, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 (Omnibus Code).23 The Omnibus
Code was more liberal toward foreign investment than those enacted under
Marcos. 24 However, the Omnibus Code still contained several onerous
provisions that have dissuaded prospective investors. For example, the
Omnibus Code limited foreign equity to less than 40 percent, and required
divestment of foreign equity over that amount.25 The Omnibus Code also
barred foreign ownership of real estate (as required under the Constitution),26
and provided a broad definition of the industries in which all or most foreign
investment is prohibited.27 The Omnibus Code also required that all foreign
investments seeking investment incentives receive prior approval of the
21 In February 1986, Corazon Aquino and her supporters overturned the dictatorial rle of
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. Aquino's metorical rise to power was based on her promises to make
radical reforms in the governance of the Philippines. Her ultimate victory, and the Marcos' flight from the
country was commonly viewed as a dictate to make massive changes in the government, such as a new
Constitution, new foreign investment policies, and a new land reform program. Lawrence MacDonald, Six
Years After Revolution in the Philippines. Many Question the Extent of Promised Reforms, Asian wall
Street Journal, 1, 4 (Apr. 27, 1992); Jeffrey M. Reidinger, "Redistributive Reform in Transitional
Democracies: Philippine Agrarian Reform." Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of Princeton University,
62-81. 251-306 (Jan. 1991). See for brief discussion of land reform laws and problems in the Philippines:
Timothy M. Hanstad, Philippine Land Reform: The Just Compensation Issue, 66 Wash L Rev 2 (1988).
22 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1986).
23 The Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 (Omnibus Code), Executive Order No. 226, enacted on
July 17, 1987.
24 See the following sources for discussion of Marcos' economic and foreign investment policies that
were dissuasive of foreign investment: Ferdinand Marcos, The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1979): for Marcos' views on the Philippine economy; H.G.A.
Averch. F.H. Denton and J.E. Koehler. .4 Crisis ofAmbiguit: Political and Economic Development in
the Philippines. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Jan. 1970): on the decline of the Philippine
economy before martial law.
25 Omnibus Code, Articles 15 and 46. However. the Omnibus Code permitted 100 percent equity in
particular export and "Pioneer" enterprises, "Pioneer" enterprises are those ventures, that due to their
technological, economic strategic value, that are given special preferences and incentives to invest in the
Philippines. Omnibus Code, Articles 17 and 32(1). The Omnibus further permitted 100 percent equity
ownership in enterprises registered with the Export Processing Authority. Omnibus Code, Articles 39 and
78.
26 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Article 7, Section 2.
27 Omnibus Code, Article 47.
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Philippine Board of Investments (BOI). 28 The BOI broadly defined standards
for the exclusion of foreign investments which the BOI applied inconsistently
on a case-by-case basis to each applicant.29
The Omnibus Code also imposed numerous terms and conditions that
limited the normal business judgrents of the foreign investor.30 For example,
corporations were required to place Philippine nationals on corporate boards,
to give priority to Philippine creditors in the distribution of assets upon
insolvency, dissolution, or revocation of licenses. 31 Further, the Omnibus
Code placed limitations on the nature of manufacturing and technology
licenses that may be issued between Philippine enterprises and foreign
investors. 32
Despite the restrictions and conditions imposed on foreign investment,
many investors chose to invest in the Philippines. Several of the investments
were of significant value. Yet, the two cases discussed below reveal another
reason why prospective investors are cautious of investing in the Philippines;
inconsistent decisions from the Philippine judiciary have increased
uncertainty, cost, and nuisance of judicial review of investment approvals.
C. The Conflicting Case Law
Foreign investors generally view the administration of the Philippine
foreign investment laws as capricious and arbitrary.33 Two recent Philippine
Supreme Court cases illustrate why. The first, Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. v. National Telecommunications Commission,34 upheld the
28 Omnibus Code, Articles 3, 7(3), and 34.
29 Omnibus Code, Article 47:" Permissible Investments ... the enterprise ... shall be granted
unless the proposed investment -
c) Would be made in an enterprise engaged in an area adequately being exploited by Philippine
nationals: or...
e) Would not contribute to the sound and balanced development of the national economy on a
self-sustaining basis."
30 Omnibus Code, Article 48.3 1 Omnibus Code. Article 49.3 2 Omnibus Code, Articles 50.
33 Further, foreign investment in the Philippines is often an emotional issue with Filipinos and it
has been said that the administration of its investment laws are carried out with "rhetoric instead of logic."
Leo P. Gonzaga, Presence of Foreign Business Has Become Emotional Issue, 10:10 East Asian Executive
Reports 24 (Nov. 15, 1988). Citing policy instability as an investment deterrent, Joel McCormick,
Instability Hampers Philippines' Growth .... 17:11 Electronic Business 3. 49 (June 3, 1991): Leo P.
Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Regulatory Developments, 11:8 East Asian Executive Reports 13 (Aug. 15,
1989).
34 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v National Telecommunications Commission. 190 Phil.
Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. 717 (1990).
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authority of the National Telecommunications Commission, an executive
branch agency, to grant permission to Express Telecommunications Co., a
domestic subsidiary of an international telecommunications company, to
operate its cellular telephone network in the Philippines and to order an
equitable sharing of infrastructure with the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. The second case, Garcia v. Board of Investments,35 directly
overruled the authority of the executive branch agency in charge of regulating
foreign investment, holding that the Philippine Board of Investments (BOI),
the agency regulating foreign investment, did not have the authority to
approve particular investment related decisions, and that the Philippine
Government, not the foreign investor, had the "final say" as to where a
particular investment may be placed and the particular inputs it may use.
These cases demonstrate the Philippine Supreme Court's ability to
legitimize, or overrule, executive branch authority in administering foreign
investment laws. The Philippine Long Distance Telephone case finds the
Court narrowly interpreting its powers over executive branch decisions, thus
respecting the executive branch's authority to make foreign investment-related
determinations. Conversely, in the Garcia case, the Court interpreted its
powers to overrule executive decisions broadly, with deleterious results in
terms of foreign investment. The Philippine Long Distance Telephone and
Garcia cases also reflect the opposing economic policies that alternately
attract and divert foreign investment in the Philippines: the pro-foreign
investment desires for "free competition" and "modem, efficient and
continuous" products and services, 36 and the nationalistic feelings, that desire
to exclude foreign investment, that often underlie Philippine legislation and
judicial decisions.37
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Telecommunications
Commission
The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT), sought to
prevent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) from expanding its
existing radio franchise 38 by establishing and operating a cellular mobile
35 Garcia v Board oflnvestments, 191 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. 288 (1990).
36 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 190 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. at 737.
37 See note 18 and accompanying text.
38 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 190 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. at 722-23; Republic Act
No. 2090, otherwise known as "An Act Granting Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a Franchise
to Establish Radio Stations for Domestic and Transoceanic Telecommunications." Felix Alberto and Co.,
Inc (FACI) was the original corporate name, but it was subsequently changed to ETCI in 1964.
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telephone system and alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and
Southern Luzon.39 PLDT urged the Court to reject ETCI's application to
expand its existing franchise, arguing that the regulatory agency that oversees
all telecommunications in the Philippines, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), was unauthorized to permit the franchise to operate such
a telecommunications system. PLDT asserted that the NTC's approval was an
abuse of its discretion.40  The Court weighed both legal and policy
considerations in its decision.
The critical legal issue was the NTC's interpretation of the term
"radiotelephony" in ETCI's original franchise grant. 41 PLDT argued that
"radiotelephony" did not include the operation of a cellular telephone network
and paging system. Deferring to the NTC's decision, the Supreme Court ruled
that the agency was "legally clothed with authority and given ample
discretion" to decide such matters,42 and that the NTC's interpretation given
to the franchise grant's language should be accorded "great weight and
respect" as the "agency [was] possessed of the necessary special knowledge,
expertise and experience."43 Thus, the NTC's broad construction of the term
"radiotelephony" to include cellular telephone and paging networks, could not
be set aside short "proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of
law."44
In addition to this legal issue, the Court considered policy issues, such
as public need, public interest, the desire for freer competition, and the poor
performance of PLDT's telephone monopoly. 45 The Court found that ETCI's
entry into the Philippines' telecommunications market would benefit the
public interest by providing improved performance and enhanced
infrastructure, despite being a foreign controlled subsidiary.46 The Court held
that this particular exercise of regulatory authority was for the "common
39 Id.4 0 Id at 726, 733.
41 Id at 727. Republic Act No. 2090 grants ETCI "the right and privilege of constructing, installing,
establishing and operating in the entire Philippines radio stations for reception and transmission of
messages on radio stations in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and public base,
aeronautical and land mobile stations. xxx with the corresponding relay stations for the reception and
transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony xxx." (emphasis in the
original)
42 Id at 726-27.
43 Id at 728; citingAsturias Sugar Central, Inc. v Commissioner of Customs. et al., 29 Phil. Sup. Ct.
Rep. Ann. 617 (1969).4 4 Id, citing the rule provided for in Tupas Local Chapter No. 979 v NLRC, et al., 139 Phil. Sup. Ct.
Rep. Ann. 478 (1985).
45 Id at 736-37.
46 Id.
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good," that such communication services were vital to modernizing the
Philippines' infrastructure, and that an inefficient public utility, such as the
PLDT, must yield to the public's interests. 47
The PLDT decision illustrates the degree of deference the Court paid in
this instance to the regulatory agency's authority in upholding the exercise of
its powers over foreign investment. The case also illustrates a pro-investment
sentiment. However, soon after the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
opinion, the Court appeared to substantially reverse itself in Garcia v. Board
of Investments.
2. Garcia vs. Board of Investments
In a controversial ruling issued less than one month after Philippine
Long Distance Telephone, the Philippine Supreme Court issued a decision
that had immediate negative repercussions on foreign investment in the
Philippines. 48 In Garcia v. Board of Investments49 the Court held that
Philippine Board of Investments (BOI), the executive agency empowered to
regulate foreign investment in the Philippines, had abused its discretion by
approving a revision to a foreign investor's original investment application.50
In contrast to the Philippine Long Distance Telephone case, in Garcia, the
Court was substantially less deferential to the decision of an executive branch
agency which regulated aspects of foreign investment. Underlying the Court's
opinion was a nationalistic fervor that has deterred foreign investment for
decades.
In Garcia v. Board of Investments, Congressman Enrique T. Garcia,
the representative for the district of Bataan, petitioned the Supreme Court to
set aside the decision by the BOI approving the transfer of the site of a
proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas, 51 and to shift the
petroleum feed stock for the plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
4 7 Id.
48 Philippine Investment Falls as Recession Bites. Reuters Money Report. (Dec. 20, 1991); and Leo
P. Gonzaga, Petrochemicals Project: US! Tired of Hassles, 12:12 East Asian Executive Reports 18 (Dec.
15, 1990).
49 Garcia v Board ofInvestments, 191 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. 288 (1990).
50 Id.
51 Both areas are in Central Luzon, roughly equal distances from Metro-Manila.
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liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).52 The central issue of the case was whether
the foreign investor had the right of final choice of the plant's site.53
The principal foreign investor in this case, a Taiwanese corporation,
USI Far East Corporation, formed a Philippine corporation, Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) to become a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. 54 In approving the investment, the BOI accorded BPC
particular investment incentives, and the House of Representatives approved
a bill introduced by the petitioner that eliminated the 48% ad valorum (value
added) tax on the plant's naphtha feed stock. 55 However, within a year of the
investment's approval, BPC sought to amend its original project application
by changing the plant site from Bataan to Batangas. 56 BPC cited the following
factors for its desire to transfer sites: the continuing Communist insurgency,
an unstable labor situation, and the presence of a large LPG depot in
Batangas.57 The BOI approved the transfer of plant site over the objections
of several members of the Philippine Senate and House, and President
Aquino's stated preference that the plant be established in Bataan.58 The BOI
advocated for Bataan as the petrochemical site because it believed the
location would provide a better distribution of resources in the Metro Manila
area. 59 However, the BOI believed that it could only recommend a particular
site, and that the foreign investor had the "final choice" as to the location of a
particular project.60
52 Garcia, 191 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. at 289-90. Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, of the district
incorporating Bataan. The original petition was denied after petitioner seemed "to lose interest by failing
to appear at the hearing."
53 Idat 290-91.5 4 Id at 292.
55 Id. These incentives, offered under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, included a tax
exemption on raw materials, repatriation of the proceeds of investment liquidation, and guaranteed
remittance of earnings on investments.5 6 Id at 292-93. The application stated that BPC would: 1) increase the investment amount from US
$220 million to US $320 million, 2) increase the production capacity of its plant, 3) change the feed stock
from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG, and 4) transfer the job site from Bataan to Batangas.
57 Id. The LPG depot in Batangas is owned by a subsidiary of a large multinational corporation,
Shell Corporation. The fact that Shell's multinational status was stated in the Court's opinion implies it
was important to the Court's determination of the issue. The source of the original petroleum feedstock is
a Philippine native corporation.58 Idat 293.
5 9 1d.
6 0 Id. Citing the BOl's Vice-Chairman Tomas 1. Alcantara's testimony before the Philippine Senate.
Alcantara asserted that: "The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site
of the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro-
Manila area. xxx In advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical complex, the
BOI, however, made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the
B01 or the government for that matter could only recommend as to where the project should be located.
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The Court held the BO's position to be a "grave abuse of [it's]
discretion,"61 stating that BPC should be held to its original choice of job site
as it is "ideal" for BPC's purposes.62 The Court enumerated several other
factors that were decisive in its analysis: the fact that the government owned
the corporation that would provide the feed stock naphtha to the BPC plant in
Bataan, that such a site change would divert needed dollars from the
government's other development projects, and that the move would not be
consonant with State's objectives of promoting "economic nationalism.'"63
Citing the Philippine Constitution as authority, the Court ruled that such a
move in job sites would constitute unfair foreign competition and trade
practices against Filipino enterprises and in the national interest could not
permitted.64 Striking a notably nationalist tone, the majority opinion written
by Justice Gutierrez concluded by stating:
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who
in part said he would not mind having a government run like hell
by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this
case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary
investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with
our heritage. 65
The dissenting justices argued that the Court should have deferred to
the regulatory agencies discretion in this case. 66 In dissent, Justices Grino-
Aquino and Melencio-Herrera admitted that the BOI, not the foreign investor,
makes the final choice of plant site. 67 However, the dissent argued that the
The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would
in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project." (emphasis in the original)
61 Id at 297.
62 id at 294.
63 Id at 294-96.
64 Id at 296-97.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987):
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. (emphasis added)
6 5 Id at 297.
66 d at 289-302.
6 7 Id.
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Court overstepped its Constitutional grant of judicial power by exercising the
powers reserved to the BOI, an executive branch agency.68 The dissenting
justices held that BOI's decision to approve the transfer was not an abuse of
its discretion. 69 Rather they found that the BOI approved the transfer because
it recognized the justifications given by the proponent of the project.70
The dissenters stated that the Supreme Court may review and annul
executive and legislative actions when they conflict with the Constitution or
existing laws, or where the respective branch or authority has abused its
discretion, but the Court may not make decisions that the executive should
have made nor pass the laws that the legislature should have passed.71 That
the Court may disagree with a particular valid BOI decision does not
empower it to annul that decision the dissenters argued; this was a policy-
making matter that lay in the area of competence and expertise of the
executive and legislative branches.72 This result would have been consistent
with the result of Philippine Long Distance Telephone.
The Garcia decision represents a contradiction of the Philippine
Supreme Court's ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone. In Philippine
Long Distance Telephone the Court expressed a deference for the executive
branches authority over foreign investment, and acknowledged the benefits of
particular forms of foreign investment. In Garcia on the other hand, the Court
refused to defer to an executive branches decision regarding foreign
investment, and explicitly disavowed the benefits of foreign investment.
Garcia is an extreme illustration of the nationalistic sentiment found in the
Philippine Constitution, the Omnibus Investments Code and the Philippine
Judiciary.
68 Id at 300. Further, the dissenters held that the plaintiff, Garcia, had sought the wrong appeals
process to appeal the 1OI's decision. According to the Omnibus Investments Act, under which BPC's
investment was originally approved, Congressman Garcia's sole recourse against the BOI's action is an
appeal to the President, not to the Court. The dissent cited Article 36, Omnibus Investments Code of
1987: the only appeal provided for in the Code is to the Office of the President. which must be made
within thirty (30) days after order or decision is made.
69 Id at 300-02.
70 Id at 300.
71 Id.
72 Idat 301.
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II. THE 1991 STATUTES
Philippine Long Distance Telephone and Garcia cases, contributed to
an overall decline in foreign investment in the Philippines. 73  Foreign
investment, particularly from Taiwan, contracted by much as 90 percent due
to the Garcia ruling.74 For example, USI Far East, the principal foreign
investor in Garcia, completely withdrew its "flagship" petrochemicals project
from the Philippines, and moved production to Malaysia. 75 One of USI's
Taiwanese partners in the Bataan project, General Plastics, also tired of the
lengthy litigation. General Plastics withdrew as USIs joint venture partner
and has since established a petrochemical complex in Thailand. 76
The Philippine legislature responded to these foreign investment
declines by enacting two significant statutes to address the substantial
declines in foreign investment. Both the Foreign Investments Act of 199177
and the 1991 Local Governments Code,78 increased the accessibility of the
Philippine economy to foreign investors. The following section evaluates the
effectiveness of these laws and concludes that they are insufficient to address
the overwhelming problem of declines in foreign investment.
73 Jeremy Clifi, Investors Steer Clear of Trouble-Prone Philippines, Reuter Business Report (June
25, 1991). The BOI stated that approved foreign investment in the Philippines dropped 28 percent, from
12.8 billion pesos to 9.2 billion pesos, in the first five months of 1991. Domestic investment also declined
substantially.
Among other political and natural events contributing the decline in foreign investment were the
eruption of Mt. Pinotubo and the resulting damage to the Philippines infrastructure has diminished
investor confidence. Jeremy ClifM, Investors Steer Clear of Trouble-Prone Philippines, Reuter Business
Report (June 25, 1991). The withdrawal of the U.S. military bases is viewed by some as a destabilizing
factor in the Philippine investment climate, as have the national elections of May 1992. See Lawrence
MacDonald. Manila is Unprepared for Withdrawal by U.S., Asian Wall Street Journal, 1. 16 (Jan. 6,
1992); Bob Drogin, 'Guns, Goons, Gold' Time in Philippines, Los Angeles Times, part A. p. 6 (Feb. 10,
1992); and Claudia Rosett. Philippine Political Climate Offers Hope, Asian Wall Street Journal, 14 (Feb.
24, 1992). John J. Hampton, Around the Pacific in 80 Ways, Business Insurance, 31 (Aug. 27. 1990). Of
nine Asia-Pacific nations rated, the Philippines was held to be the most risky investment host, primarily
due to political instability.
7 Philippine Investment Falls as Recession Bites, Reuters Money Report, (Dec. 20, 1991): cites
Trade and Industry Secretary Peter Garrucho as stating that Taiwanese investment was particularly
affected by the Garcia ruling. Leo P. Gonzaga, Petrochemicals Project: US! Tired of Hassles, 12:12 East
Asian Executive Reports 18 (Dec. 15, 1990): article states that even before the Garcia ruling, there
appeared to be a negative investment and divestment trend.
7 Leo P. Gonzaga, Petrochemicals Project: US! Tired of Hassles, 12:12 East Asian Executive
Reports 18 (Dec. 15, 1990).
76 Id.
77 The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (Investments Act), Republic Act No. 7042.
78 The Local Governments Code of 1991 (Local Code), Republic Act No. 7160.
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A. The Foreign Investments Act of 1991
The negative economic effects resulting from declines in foreign
investment and the relative success of the Philippines' Southeast Asian
neighbors captured the attention of the policy makers and business interests in
Manila.79 After 20 months of negotiations and contentious public debate, the
Philippines enacted the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 on June 13, 1991.80
The Foreign Investments Act, the first major revision of Filipino
investment legislation since the late 1960's, signals to foreign investors that
the Philippines has taken on a new seriousness about attracting and utilizing
foreign capital;8 ' The Investments Act states the government's policy is to
attract, promote, and welcome productive investments from foreigners in
activities that significantly contribute to national industrialization and
socioeconomic growth.82
The new legislation clarifies the limitations to foreign investment.83
The Investments Act includes a Negative List,84 which explicitly delineates
the areas of the Philippine economy that are closed to unrestricted foreign
investment.8 5 Areas of the economy not included on the Negative List are
open to unlimited or specifically limited foreign investment. 86 By making the
restrictions on foreign investment explicit and specific, the Philippine
79 Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment Climate, 10:6 East Asian Executive Reports 22 (June 15,
1988); and Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Nationalistic Mood Begins to Change. 11:5 East Asian
Executive Reports 18 (May 15, 1989).8 0 The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (Investments Act), Republic Act No. 7042.
81 Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment Legislation Proposed, 13:5 East Asian Executive Reports 17
(May 15, 1991); Jamie P. Horsely, Forex Controls Liberalized in Third Major Reform Package, 14:1 East
Asian Executive Reports 9 (Jan. 15. 1992).
82 Investments Act, Section 2.
83 The following articles discuss the Philippine government's efforts to liberalize the economy by
reducing price controls, enacting a new tax code, reducing customs duties, and eliminating foreign
exchange regulations. Bernardo Villegas, Philippine Progress. The Economist 6 (July 13. 1991); Jamie P.
Horsely, Fores Controls Liberalized in Third Major Reform Package, 14:1 East Asian Executive Reports
9 (Jan. 15, 1992); Richard Gourlay, The Philippines; Rocky Road to Transition, Financial Times, 1 (Feb.
17, 1992); Victor Mallet, The Philippines 4; Belated Attempt to Remedy Matters - Investment, Financial
Times. 4 (Feb. 17, 1992); Trading with the Philippines: Regulations, Taxes, Practices. 13:3 East Asian
Executive Reports 10 (March 15. 1992).8 4 See Appendix, an Executive Summary of the Investments Act's "Negative List." Jamie P. Horsely,
Philippines Enacts New Investment Code, 13:7 East Asian Executive Reports 9 (July 15. 1991).
Other Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have incorporated
similar 'Negative Lists' or reserve lists into their respective foreign investment laws with much success.
See Investment Laws of the World, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry: New York; Indonesia - issued 1978,
updated March 1991; Malaysia - issued 1988, updated March 1991; Thailand - Investment Promotion
Act, 29 April. B.E. 2520 (A.D. 1977).
85 Investments Act, Section 3(g).
86 See Appendix.
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government intended to reduce bureaucratic discretion in approving
investment applications, and to diminish the attendant delays and costs.
87
During a three year transitionary period,88 the Investments Act gives foreign
investors extensive access to industries not listed on the Negative List. After
this transitionary period domestic businesses and industries may petition the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) to receive
protection from foreign investments by their inclusion on the Negative List.89
At this time one can not predict how NEDA will answer these petitions.
The Investments Act permits greater foreign equity ownership than the
previous investment law, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987.90 The
Omnibus Code limited foreign equity ownership to no more than 40
percent, 91 but permitted 100 percent equity in particular export and "pioneer"
enterprises, 92 as well as in enterprises registered with the Export Processing
Authority. 93 The Code also required that all foreign investments seeking
investment incentives receive prior approval.
By contrast, the Investments Act permits qualifying foreign
investments without prior approval, 94 and allows up to 100 percent equity
ownership,95 particularly during the initial three-year transitionary period.
96
Upon registration with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission,
or in the case of a sole proprietorship, the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection,97 foreigners can invest up to 100 percent of the capital
87 Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investments Legislation Proposed, 13:5 East Asian Executive Reports
17 (May 15, 1991).
88Investments Act. Section 15: and Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7042):
Implementing Rules and Regulations, Published by the National Economic and Development Authority,
October 1991, p. 28-29. "Transitionary Period": for three years ending November 12, 1994, List C, areas
in which NEDA has determined that existing enterprises already adequately serve the needs of the
economy and consumers, will consist solely of: a) import and wholesale activities not integrated with
production and manufacture of goods, b) services currently requiring a license, and c) enterprises owned
in the majority by a foreign licensor that assemble, process or manufacture goods for the domestic market
under license from the licensor. The three-year transitionary period became effective when the
Investments Acts' implementing rules were issued on November 13, 1991.
89 Investments Act, Section 9.
90 The Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (Omnibus Code), Executive Order No. 226.
91 See note 26.
92 "Pioneer" enterprises are those ventures, that due to their technological, economic strategic value,
that are given special preferences and incentives to invest in the Philippines. Omnibus Code, Articles 17
and 32(1).
93 Omnibus Code, Articles 39 and 78.
94 Investments Act, Sections 3(a) and 5.
95 Id. Foreign investors may own up to 100 percent equity ownership in several specified areas, as
opposed to the 40 percent limitation of the Omnibus Code.
96 Investments Act, Section 15.
97 Investments Act, Section 5.
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in an enterprise that does not appear on the Negative List. For enterprises
appearing on the Negative List, foreign investors can invest up to the legally
mandated limit (generally 40 percent of outstanding capital) without prior
approval. 98
In addition to the Negative List, the Investments Act requires the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)99 to formulate and
publish a list of strategic industries in which foreign investors are encouraged
to invest, by way of investment incentives.100 These are industries that: 1) are
crucial to accelerate industrialization of the Philippines, 2) require massive
capital investments and highly specialized or advanced technology, 3) are
characterized by strong backward and forward linkages to other industries in
the country (such as the telecommunications technologies and the
petrochemical complex discussed in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
and Garcia cases above), and 4) generate substantial foreign exchange
through import substitution and exports. 101 NEDA must publish the strategic
industry list within eighteen months of the date the Investments Act became
effective. 102
The strategic industry list specifies a desired, but not legally mandated,
percentage of equity ownership by public and private Filipino investors. 103 In
the past, the inability to raise sufficient Filipino capital to satisfy the legally
proscribed Filipino equity ownership requirements has stalled many large
strategic projects. 104
Further, the Investments Act repeals the Omnibus Code's divestment
requirement. 105 The Investments Act now encourages as a matter of policy,
but does not require, foreign-owned enterprises serving the domestic market
98 Investments Act. Section 3(g).
99 NEDA is the executive agency empowered to establish national development priorities and
regulations. and has oversight over the Board of Investments (BOI). Forward, Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of 1991), Rule I, Sections I(s) and (w),
Rule VIII. Sections 2 and 3. and Rule XII. Sections 2 and 3.
100 See note 1.
101 Investments Act, Section 10.
10 2 Id. Strategic industry list should be published by May 1993.
103 ld
104 Leo P. Gonzaga, Foreign Investment: Nationalistic Mood Begins to Change, 11:5 East Asian
Executive Reports 18 (May 15, 1989). House Speaker Ramon Mitra cites the inability of Filipinos to raise
the 60 percent capital equity required under the Omnibus Investments Code, particularly in capital-
intensive joint ventures, as a primary reason that many important projects have not been placed in the
Philippines. He also cites this particular issue as a reason to liberalize the Philippines' investment laws.
i05 Investments Act, section 2. See note 26 regarding the divestment requirement of the Omnibus
Code. The Investments Act repealed the Omnibus Codes divestment requirement under Article 46(b)
which limited foreign equity ownership to 40 percent.
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to undertake measures that will gradually increase Filipino participation in
their businesses, such as transferring technology, taking Filipino partners,
appointing Filipinos to corporate boards, and enhancing the skills of Filipino
workers. 106
The Foreign Investments Act is perhaps the cornerstone of a series of
legislative undertakings to make the Philippines more inviting to foreign
investors. 107 The Act places fewer restrictions and conditions on the foreign
investor, and eliminates much of the bureaucratic discretion that investors
encountered in the past inasmuch as it allows less bureaucratic discretion in
interpreting the Act's provisions. The Negative List and strategic industry list
permit more access to the Philippine economy while preserving important
legal and national interests.
B. Philippine Supreme Court Upholds the Foreign Investments Act
The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Foreign Investments Act in a December 1991 opinion. In Garcia v. The
National Economic and Development Authority, Congressman Enrique T.
Garcia, asserted that the Act violated constitutional provisions calling for the
development of a "self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos,'108 by permitting 100 percent foreign ownership in
most industries except those on the Negative List. 109
The Court held that the Act did not violate the constitutional provisions
Congressman Garcia had raised.' 0 The Court stated that the Investments Act
was well reasoned and carefully studied by the Philippine Congress and the
President, and that the Court was enjoined from passing on the matter short of
an abuse of discretion by the other branches. The Court did not find such
abuse."'1 Notably, the Court stated in contradiction of its holding in Garcia
106 Investments Act, Section 2. Earlier drafts of the Act, in both the Senate and the House, had
required divestment of foreign majority control within specified periods.
107 The Philippines has also liberalized foreign exchange controls, instituted tariff reform, and has
considered extending the legally permitted land lease period from 25 years to 50 years. Leo P. Gonzaga,
Foreign Investment: Tinkering with the Rules, 12:5 East Asian Executive Reports 18 (May 15, 1990);
Jamie P. Horsely, Forex Controls Liberalized in Third Major Reform Package, 14:1 East Asian Executive
Reports 9 (Jan. 15, 1992). See note 75.
108 Garcia v National Economic and Development Authority, G.R. No. 100883, p. 1-2, citing the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article 1, Section 2.10 9 See Appendix.
110 Garcia, G.R. No. 100883, at 9-10.
II Idat 10-11.
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v. Board of Investments,112 that it "may not annul an act of the political
departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical." (emphasis
added)"l 3
Garcia also asserted that the 'three year transitionary period' would
place Filipino enterprises at a "fatal disadvantage in their own country.""l 4
The Court held that the economic rights of Filipinos are preserved under the
Constitution and other specific -statutes and are not diminished by the
Investments Act. 115 Citing the Negative List at length, the Court held that the
Investments Act secured the rights and interests of Filipinos in the national
economy by reserving to them specific industries, while permitting increased
foreign investment in areas where Philippine capital has been lacking." 6
Further, citing the intervenor's argument, the Court held that the Act
preserved the rights and interests of Filipino businesses as the Act's overall
strategy is "to develop a self-reliant economy" and to promote full
employment for Filipinos.117 The Court commented on Congressman Garcia's
"nationalistic zeal," stating that it was misplaced by being directed in the form
of this litigation, and should be reserved for his legislative activities.118
The Garcia v. The National Economic and Development Authority
case signifies a significant reversal of the Philippine Supreme Court's
nationalistic stance taken in Garcia v. Board of Investments. The Court
expressed deference for the legislature's and executive's law making powers
and upheld the Foreign Investments Act, thus promoting increased and more
extensive foreign investment.
C. The Local Rule Code
After years of centralizing important government functions, the
Philippine government, in an experiment in local democracy, enacted the
Local Governments Code (Local Code). 119 The Local Code allows local
112 Garcia v Board of Investments, 191 Phil. Sup. Ct. Rep. Ann. 288.
113 Garcia. G.R No. 100883. at 11. See discussion regarding the previous Garcia case in notes 59-
67 and accompanying text.
1141dat 4.
115 Id.
116 Id at 6-8.
117 Id at 8. The intervenor cited. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, was one of the Investments Act's
principal authors. In Philippine jurisprudence an intervenor serves the similar function as an amicus
curia.
"lldat 11.
119 The Local Governments Code of 1991 (Local Code), Republic Act No. 7160. The Local Code
repeals Batas Pambansa Big. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Governments Code," Executive Order
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authorities to spend higher percentages of the national taxes they collect,
giving local government units (LGUs) 120 virtual financial independence.
Specifically, the LGUs are to receive 30 percent of national government
revenues in 1992, 35 percent in 1993, and 40 percent in 1994 and
thereafter.121 Prior to the Local Code, LGUs received little or none of the
national governments revenues.
More importantly, the Local Code delegates to local governments new
powers to attract foreign investment. 122 To carry out foreign investment
policies and other development functions, each LGU will form a 'Local
Development Council 23 that serves several functions. The Development
Councils must, among other things: 1) formulate long-term, medium-term, and
annual economic development plans and policies, 124 2) appraise and prioritize
socioeconomic development plans and projects,125 3) formulate local
investment incentives to promote the inflow and direction of private
investment capital,126 and 4) coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the
implementation of local and national development programs and projects. 127
The development and investment incentive powers devolved to the LGUs
under the Local Code, formerly belonged to the Board of Investment under
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991.128 Until the Local Code became
effective on January 1, 1992, LGUs such as provinces, cities and barangays
were prohibited from assuming or carrying out development or investment
No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988), and other less prominent acts. Local Code, Section
534.
120 LGUs under this code are defined as 'barangays' or villages, municipalities, cities, and
provinces. Local Code. Section 17.
121 Local Code, Book I1. See Jose N. Nolledo, The 1991 Local Governments Code with Basic
Features, National Book Store: Manila, 1991, p. xlv.
122 Local Code, Section 2(a), Section 17(a). The stated purpose of the Code is: " ...that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and to make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals." (emphasis added)
123 Local Code, Section 106(a).
124 Local Code, Section 109(a)(1).
125 Local Code, Section 109(a)(3).
126 Local Code, Section 109(a)(4).
127 Local Code. Section 109(a)(5) and (b)(3).
128 Investments Act, Section 13; Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7042
(Foreign Investments Act of 1991), Rule 1: Definitions, Section I(s) and (t). The Board of Investments is
overseen by the National Economic and Development Authority.
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policies that would conflict with or nullify the powers of the BOI or
NEDA.129
Thus, the Local Code grants LGUs a greater degree of local
development and investment autonomy, which the LGUs never had before.
Consequently, the Local Code weakens the decision-making powers of the
national government in local matters. Through the BOI and NEDA, the
national government will still decide upon development and investment
policies of national importance and priority, such as the "Negative List" and
investment incentives offered to national government-promoted
enterprises. 130 But the LGUs are now free to develop local development and
investment programs. 131 Consequently, LGUs would have authority to offer
local investment incentives in addition, or in exception, to those offered by
the national government.132
However, other provisions of the Local Code temper the implied power
of the LGUs to act contrarily to the wishes of the national government. The
Local Code specifically calls for all national agencies to coordinate with the
LGUs concerned in the discharge of the agencies' duties, and that these
agencies "ensure the participation of local; government units in the planning
and implementation of said national projects" (emphasis added).133 Further,
the President has direct supervisory authority over the LGUs "to ensure that
129 Investments Act, Section 12: "Consistent Government Action.- No agency, instrumentality or
political subdivision of the Government shall take any action on conflict with or which will nullify the
provisions of this Act, or any certificate or authority granted hereunder."
130 The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 repealed Article 44 to Article 56 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987. Articles 10 to 43 of the Omnibus Code qualify and enumerate the investment
incentives available to a promoted enterprise by the national government.
131 Local Code. Section 17(a) provides that the LGUs may "discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them ... " and Section 17(b)(3)(ix) provides
provinces the distinct authority to operate investment support services. Section 18 allows the LGU to
generate and allocate in furtherance of their development.
132 Jose N. Nolledo, The 1991 Local Governments Code with Basic Features, p. lvi-lvii, (Manila:
National Book Store, 1991); Local Code, Section 17(a), Section 106(a), Section 109(a)(1), (3), (5) and
Section 109(b)(3).
This assertion is further supported by Local Code. Section 5(a) which states that: "Any provision
on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor . . . Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned;" by Section 5(c) which states that the Code will be liberally interpreted to emphasize the
LGU's powers in accelerating economic development, and under Section 5(e) that local customs and
traditions should play an important role in resolving controversies.
Professor Antonio Santos of the University of the Philippines School of Law, telephone
conversation with author, April 15, 1992: No cases have been filed challenging the local government
unit's powers to offer investment incentives that either accent or contradict those incentives offered by the
national government.
133 Local Code, Section 25(b).
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their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions."'134
Thus, the active supervisory intervention of the President limits the ability of
the LGUs to fully exercise discretion to promote development and
investment.
The Local Governments Code's delegation to the LGUs of greater
regulatory powers over foreign investment has the potential to increase
foreign investment in particular regions of the Philippines. The conglomerated
effect of these regional gains could substantially increase overall foreign
investment in the Philippines. The experience of the city and province of
Cebu demonstrates the potential benefits of local authority over foreign
investment policy.
1. A Local Government Example: Cebu
Cebu is a densely populated island in the central Visayas region of the
Philippines, about 350 miles south of Manila. It has a history of independence
from the politics of Manila, and has become the Philippines second largest
commercial center.135 With a large core of entrepreneurial ethnic Chinese, the
city has thrived on labor-intensive manufacturing, 136 with little regard for the
happenings of politics and government in "politically fog-bound Manila."'137
Cebu has emerged as an economic dynamo, with a 20 percent growth rate in
1988 and double-digits since then, despite the global recession and the
typhoon that struck the area in 1990.138 Cebu has become the model of
economic progress for the rest of the Philippines, with exports that run at four
times the national level and with unemployment a fraction of Manila's. 139
Cebu undertook significant investment and development activities prior
to the enactment of the Local Governments Code. 140 Cebu actively promoted
foreign investment by streamlining the process for approving investments.141
The government pioneered innovative investment financing such as the
country's first regional commercial bonds, 142 municipal bonds known as
134 Local Code, Section 25(a).
135 Sheila Teffi. Feisty Filipino Province Rivals Manila as New Business Frontier, Christian
Science Monitor 6 (May 1, 1991).
136 Id.
137 Richard Gourlay, The Philippines 4: Recovery Hopes - Regional Development, Financial Times,
6 (Feb. 17. 1992).
138 Sheila Tefft, Feisty Filipino Province.... 6.139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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CEBUs (Cebu Equity Bond Urits). 143 Cebu has subsequently directed
revenues from the bonds toward upgrading regional infrastructure, including
the construction of the Philippines' newest international airport.144 Local rule
in Cebu has been successful, and suggests that the new Local Governments
Code may enable more local and regional governments to develop "the
infrastructure from which more Cebus could sprout."145
2. Potential Negative Implications of the Local Governments Code
Contrary to the Local Code's stated purpose, 146 this legislation will
enable some LGUs to discourage foreign investment, contributing to
unbalanced regional development of the Philippine economy. The Local Code
will enable conservative regional governments to use increased tax revenues
to promote their own narrow economic interests as opposed to the national
policies promoting industrialization and economic development.
In areas of the Philippines dominated by plantation agriculture, local
political dynasties have monopolized political and economic power for
generations. 147 The local governments in these regions have historically
adopted policies which promote the interests of the landholders and their
supporters, and not national development priorities. For example, these local
governments have successfully opposed the national program of land reform,
in order to maintain their social and economic status.148
The Local Code envisions that LGUs will use a substantial portion of
their increased tax revenues to promote foreign investment through
investment incentives, 149 not unlike those offered by Cebu. Because the Local
Code gives these rural governments complete discretion over the disposition
of these funds, some LGUs probably will use these funds for the benefit of
the landed elite by funding projects which serve the needs of plantation
agriculture. Such projects could include the construction of extensive
143 Richard Gourlay, The Philippines 4.... 6.
144Id.
145 Id.
146 Local Code, Section 2(a).
147 Professor Roy L. Prosterman, University of Washington School of Law, a leading authority on
the law and economic development, particularly in the area of agrarian reform, interview with author May
24, 1992.
148 Jeffrey M. Reidinger, "Redistributive Reform in Transitional Democracies: Philippine Agrarian
Reform," A dissertation presented to the Faculty of Princeton University, January 1991, p. 98-104, 367-
385, 420-425; Joseph Collins, "Working Against Change," The Philippines: Fire on the Rim, 113-145
(San Francisco: Food First Books, 1989).
149 Local Code, Section 3(d).
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irrigation systems, and narrow-gauge railways servicing large farms and
processors.
These types of projects do not promote industrialization or encourage
foreign investment because they promote the continued dominance of
plantation agriculture. The plantation agriculture economy does not provide
investment opportunities for foreigners. Foreigners cannot own land,'5 0 and
generally the industries that process agricultural products, such as rice and
sugarcane, are protected under the Foreign Investment Act's "Negative
List."' 5 1
Consequently, foreign investors will gravitate to areas such as Cebu
which offer significant investment incentives, while avoiding those areas
dominated by plantation agriculture. Thus, the Local Governments Code has
the strong potential to undermine the national development goals of the
Foreign Investments Act.
D. Investor Services
The Foreign Investments Act established generalized national priorities
for foreign investment. Effectuating these priorities will require the
centralized administration of an investor support agency. Such an agency, or
investor service center, will go a long way toward increasing investors'
confidence in the Philippines' ability to administer its investment laws and
policies in an efficient and consistent manner. Currently the Philippines has
no such investor support service, or other agency that promotes investment
incentives directly to prospective investors, assists investors in the gathering
of investment information, or in complying with the numerous central and
provincial government regulations.
A centralized investment authority would: 1) speed approval of
promoted investment, 2) limit administrative discretion, and 3) standardize
regional investment policies with the priorities of the Foreign Investments Act
of 1991.
Thailand's "One-stop Service Centre" provides a model for the investor
support service that the Philippines should emulate. The Service Center was
created primarily to strengthen the Thai Board of Investment's ability to assist
investors in information-gathering and compliance with various governmental
150 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article 7, Section 2 (1986).
151 See Appendix.
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regulations. The Thai Service Center assists foreign investors by providing a
centralized, efficient approval process to investors. 152
1. Speeding-up the Approval Process
A Philippine investor support service would speed the approval of
investments in several ways. The service would assist potential investors in
gathering information needed for in the application process. Further, the
service would advocate for individual investments before any agencies
involved in the disposition of the application. The staff of the investor service
center would be familiar with the procedural and substantive processes of the
concerned agencies. Therefore, the processing of applications would proceed
more quickly than if the investors were acting alone. Furthermore, this
streamlining effect of the investor support service would attract greater
amounts of foreign investment by reducing the cost and nuisance of
complying with investment regulations.
The one-stop Service Center in Thailand demonstrates that an investor
support service does quicken the approval process. The Thai Service Center
issues and obtains required government permits for the promoted investor. 153
The Service Center considers an investment application within five days of its
submission, and notifies the applicant within twenty days whether the projects
conforms to the conditions requisite for approval. Thereafter, the successful
investment applicant receives all the required permits from the Service Center
without need for further processing by the applicant. 154
2. Limiting Administrative Discretion
In the past, unpredictable investment policy administration has been an
investment deterrent.155 A Philippine investor service center would eliminate
much of this unpredictability. By representing the investment application to
the government agencies involved in the approval process, the service center
would assure that the application is treated more objectively and fairly. The
152 The Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister Concerning the Formation of Investment
Service Centre, published in the Government Gazette, Volume 99, Part 125, Special Issue of September 3,
1982.
153 Such permits include those required for the establishment of business enterprises, the expansion
and oeration of factory facilities, building, land-use, environmental, and customs or trade permits.
54Id: Kosol Chantkul, Investment Promotion Laws, 3 Chulalongkorn L Rev 97, 105-106. (1984).
155 See notes 2 and 7.
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service would monitor the process and would thus be in the position to
identify arbitrary or inconsistent actions by involved agencies.
The center would also decrease the likelihood of arbitrary decision
making by mediating disputes between the investor and involved agencies.
The service would negotiate differences between parties so that outright
denials would occur less frequently. Furthermore, mediation would increase
the likelihood of resolutions acceptable at least in part to all parties.
3. Standardizing Regional Investment Policies with National Goals
A Philippine investor support service would minimize inconsistencies
between national and local development policies. As discussed above,
regional development policies often do not mirror the national development
policies of the Foreign Investments Act because the Local Governments Code
permits local governments to provide their own investment incentives.
The investor support service would compile and present to prospective
investors local governments' investment incentives as packages. The service
would not promote packages containing incentives that conflicted with
national development priorities. For example, the service center would not
present local incentives promoting those industries listed on the Foreign
Investment Act's "Negative List." Refusing to present incentives inconsistent
with national investment policies would encourage local governments to bring
their investment incentives into compliance with national standards.
CONCLUSION
If the Philippines continues to stand by impotently as increasing
streams of foreign investment flows around it to its Southeast Asian
neighbors, it can never hope to attain the levels of economic and societal
maturity to which it aspires. The Philippines most recent efforts to attract
foreign investment, the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 and the Local
Governments Code, are a mixed blessing, and alone cannot ensure the results
the Philippine government seeks.
Although the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 goes much farther than
its predecessors in liberalizing access to the Philippine economy, the Act
alone is not likely to attract and keep substantially increased foreign
investment. Further, with the advent of the Local Governments Code, the
national government has devolved to regional governments much of its ability
and authority to carry out a national economic development strategy. As
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discussed above, the decentralization of investor support services will be
beneficial for regions with progressive development plans such as Cebu.
Conversely, the decentralization is likely to have mixed to negative results in
areas that are less economically and socially progressive, such as areas
dominated by large plantation agriculture. For the Philippines to attract the
foreign investment it so badly seeks to develop economically, it should create
a comprehensive investor support service, not unlike the one available in
Thailand.
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APPENDIX
THE PHILIPPINES FOREIGN INVESTMENTS ACT OF 1991
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7042
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTMENTS ACT'S "NEGATIVE LIST"
The "Negative List" consists of the following:
List A: activities specifically reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of
the Philippine Constitution and specific laws, such as:
1) Mass media, the professions (accounting, architecture, law and
medicine), retail trade, and national defense industries, all of which are
completely closed to foreign investment by law; and
2) Ownership of land, natural resource exploitation, public utilities,
educational institutions, advertising, shipping and domestic air transportation,
construction, and banks, all of which are subject to 25 to 40 percent on
foreign equity. Investments Act, Section 15(A).
List B: areas of activities regulated by law:
1) Areas regulated by law involving,
a) defense related activities requiring prior authorization from the
Department of National Defense, such as the manufacture, repair, storage and
distribution of firearms, and munitions, unless the activity involves a
substantial export component and is expressly authorized to be engaged in by
an entity more than 40 percent owned by foreigners. Investments Act, Section
15(B)(1);
b) activities that affect the public health and morals, such as drug
manufacturing and distribution, gambling, bars and nightclubs. Investments
Act, Section 15(B)(2); and
2) Small and medium sized domestic market enterprises with paid in
equity capital of $500,000, unless they involve advanced technology, as
determined by the Department of Science and Technology, and export
enterprises which utilize raw materials from depletable natural resources;
Investments Act, Section 15(B)(3) and (4), Section 8(C), and Section 8(B)(2).
Amendments to List B can be made not more than once every two
years after the promulgation of the first Regular Foreign Investment Negative
List at the end of the transition period, and then must be made only by
Presidential proclamation upon recommendation of NEDA, or upon
VOL. I No. I
WINTER 1992 PHILIPPINE FOREIGN INVESTMENTEFFORTS 197
recommendations by the Secretary of Natural Defense, the Secretary of
Health, or the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports with NEDA's "motu
propio" endorsement.
List C: after the transitionary period (three years), areas of investment in
which existing enterprises already adequately serve the needs of the economy
and the consumer and do not require further foreign investments, as
determined by NEDA applying specific criteria. This criteria includes firms
owned at least sixty percent by Filipinos, ample industry capacity, sufficient
industry competition, environmental standards, and industry pricing.
Companies whose industries are included in List C will have to petition for
their industries' inclusion when the list is amended every two years.
Investments Act, Section 9.
NEDA is required to publish the first regular negative list not later than
60 days before the transitionary period expires. Each negative list is to be
prospective in operation and will not affect investments existing on its
publication date. Investments Act, Section 8.

